Limitations on the Applicability of the Felony-Murder Rule in California by Graham, Joan
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 22 | Issue 5 Article 9
1-1971
Limitations on the Applicability of the Felony-
Murder Rule in California
Joan Graham
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Joan Graham, Limitations on the Applicability of the Felony-Murder Rule in California, 22 Hastings L.J. 1327 (1971).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol22/iss5/9
LIMITATIONS ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
FELONY-MURDER RULE IN CALIFORNIA
The term felony-murder is a shorthand phrase which signifies that
malice will be imputed to a person who, while engaged in the perpetra-
tion of certain dangerous felonies, causes the death of another person.
Malice aforethought, which Professor Perkins defines as "an unjustifi-
able, unexcusable and unmitigated man-endangering-state of mind"1
is conclusively presumed by the defendant's participation in the under-
lying felony. This presumed malice-given that a causal relation exists
between the felony and the death-is sufficient to justify a conviction of
first degree murder. It is no defense that the killing was accidental or
negligent; malice is presumed despite the unintentional nature of the
death.
At early common law all felonies were within the purview of this
rule. Blackstone stated this broad doctrine quite simply- "And if one
intends to do another felony, and undesignedly kills a man, this is also
murder."2 Blackstone's statement of the rule was subsequently modi-
fied by the case law. The modem English rule came to be that only
a homicide which resulted from a felony committed in a dangerous way
was murder.3 The law in the United States is somewhat different, as
the rule applies only to a homicide occurring during the perpetration of
an "inherently dangerous felony."4  In California the felony-murder
rule is embodied in Penal Code section 189: "All murder which...
is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act punishable under section 288, is
murder of the first degree."5
In the typical felony-murder situation, the defendant kills his vic-
tim,0 an innocent bystander7 or a police officer8 while committing one
of the enumerated dangerous felonies. This Note will analyze the
legal and logical difficulties of applying the felony-murder rule to
1. R. PERKINS, CIMNAL LAW 48 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as PERKINS].
2. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAMES *201.
3. England has since abolished the felony-murder rule. Homicide Act of 1957,
5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 1.
4. People v. Philips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 578, 414 P.2d 353, 357, 51 Cal. Rptr.
225, 229 (1966).
5. CAL. PEN. CODE § 189.
6. E.g., People v. Bosby, 256 Cal. App. 2d 209, 64 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1967).
7. E.g., People v. Ulsh, 211 Cal. App. 2d 258, 27 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1962).
8. E.g., People v. Mitchell, 61 Cal. 2d 353, 392 P.2d 526, 38 Cal. Rptr. 726
(1964).
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variations of the typical situation. The following variations will be dis-
cussed: (1) The unintentional self-infliction of death by one of the
accomplices; (2) the intentional slaying of a cofelon by his confederate;
and (3) the commission of an act by the intended victim, police offi-
cer, or bystander which results in the death of one of the conspirators or
of a third party. In such circumstances the criminal responsibility of
the felon for the death in question has not always been certain.
American courts have arrived at different results under different the-
ories. The basic principle underlying the California decisions is that a
felon cannot be found guilty of murder under the felony-murder rule
if the homicide was not committed in furtherance of, or to perpetrate,
the underlying felony. The evolution of the California restrictions upon
the felony-murder rule will now be examined in detail.
California: From Ferlin to Taylor
A. Ferlin and Cabaltero: Are They Reconcilable?
People v. Ferlin9 was the first California case in which the state at-
tempted to hold a defendant criminally responsible for the death of his
coconspirator under the felony-murder rule. The evidence indicated
that the defendant and Skala conspired to burn the former's building,
thus permitting him to obtain the proceeds from an insurance policy.
10
The defendant was not present when Skala set the fire, from which he
received burns resulting in his death." The defendant was found
guilty of murder, but the trial court granted his motion for a new trial.
The California Supreme Court, affirming the order for a new trial,
held that the felony-murder rule was inapplicable for two reasons.
First, the court referred to the Penal Code's definition of murder: "the
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.' 1 2 It was
absurd to argue, the court said, that one accidentally killing himself
while engaged in the commission of a felony could be guilty of murder
under that definition." Although the court did not fully explain
why such a result would be preposterous, the reason should be clear:
A person unintentionally inflicting serious bodily injury upon himself
cannot possibly be said to have acted with malice. Nor has he com-
mitted a homicide, an essential element of murder.'" If, however, the
defendant in this case were convicted of murder, then, said the court,
under the law of conspiracy, which provides that each coconspirator is
9. 203 Cal. 587, 265 P. 230 (1928).
10. Id. at 590, 265 P. at 232.
11. Id. at 596, 265 P. at 234.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. PERKINS, supra note 1, at 34.
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liable for the acts of his accomplice, 5 the deceased would have been
guilty of his own murder. Therefore, the court concluded that it could
not "be seriously contended that one accidently killing himself while
engaged in the commission of a felony was guilty of murder." 16 That
the accidental death occurred during the perpetration of a crime is im-
material.
The court's second reason was that the death of Skala was not in
furtherance of the crime.' As explained above, the law of conspiracy
holds each of the coconspirators liable for all acts which aid in perpe-
trating the contemplated felony. Moreover, the converse is true: If the
acts of a cofelon do not further the crime in question, then only he, not
his conspirators, will be held accountable. 18 Applying this doctrine, the
court said:
It cannot be said from the record in the instant case that defendant
and deceased had a common design that deceased should acci-
dentally kill himself. Such an event was not in furtherance of the
conspiracy, but entirely opposed to it.19
The court supported its statement by citing the Illinois decision of
People v. Garippo.20  In that case while four conspirators were com-
mitting a robbery, one of the robbers was fatally wounded. It was not
certain who fired the fatal shot.2 1 When his coconspirators were tried
for his death, the trial court instructed the jury that the defendants were
responsible for the homicide if it occurred during the commission of the
felony. The appellate court reversed, holding that the death in ques-
tion could not be considered to be in furtherance of the crime. 2 "With-
out doubt there was a common design among these [defendants] to
hold up the [victim], but this design had nothing whatever to do with
the shooting of the [deceased coconspirator]. '2
3
Although it was necessary for the Ferlin court to apply this rea-
soning only to a self-inflicted death, the rationale has broader applica-
bility. Ferlin may be said to stand for the general proposition that no
death of a conspirator, whether self-inflicted or not, can be in the fur-
therance of the contemplated felony. It therefore follows, at least un-
der the reasoning of Ferlin, that the felony-murder rule should never be
applicable when a cofelon has been slain.24
15. Id. at 632-35.
16. 203 Cal. at 596, 265 P. at 234.
17. Id. at 597, 265 P. at 235.
18. PERKINS, supra note 1, at 634.
19. 203 Cal. at 597, 265 P. at 235.
20. 292 Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920).
21. Id. at 295, 127 N.E. at 76.
22. Id. at 298, 127 N.E. at 77.
23. Id.
24. It is, however, possible that, under different circumstances than those in
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However, in People v. Cabaltero,2 5 decided in 1939, the district
court of appeal affirmed the convictions of appellants who were found
guilty of the intentional slaying of a fellow conspirator during the per-
petration of a felony. In this case seven men conspired to commit a
robbery. When six of them arrived at the office of the intended vic-
tim, three of the robbers remained outside as lookouts, while the others
entered the building. The deceased (Ancheta), one of the lookouts,
was fatally shot by an accomplice, who was apparently angry at An-
cheta for having fired his gun at some passersby.
26
The court distinguished the factual situation at bar from that in
Ferlin:
[In Ferlin] the coconspirator killed himself while he alone was
perpetrating the felony he conspired to commit; whereas, here the
coconspirator was killed by one of his confederates while all were
perpetrating the crime they conspired to commit.
2 7
The court took the position that the felony-murder rule applies to "any
killing by one engaged in the commission of any of the felonies enum-
erated in said section 189, '28 thus confining the reasoning in Ferlin to
factual situations involving the unintentionol, self-inflicted death of a
cofelon. The court distinguished People v. Garippo29 on the ground
that it was not certain who fired the fatal shot in that case.3 0 The court
believed that the Illinois court exculpated the coconspirators solely be-
cause it could not be proven that one of them fired the fatal shot. In
Cabaltero, however, there was no doubt that one of the conspirators
shot the deceased.3
Although the court correctly distinguished the factual situation at
bar from those in Ferlin and Garippo, it failed to evaluate the rationale
on which the two latter cases were based. In both cases the respective
courts said that the death of the coconspirator was not part of the com-
Ferlin, a felon may be convicted for the murder of his partner although he has not
actually committed the homicide. If the deceased has died as a result of the de-
fendant's conduct which, independent of the felony, may be considered malicious, then
the felon will be held responsible for the death. It must be emphasized, however, that
criminal responsibility in such a situation is not predicated upon the felony-murder
rule. For a discussion of what acts committed during a felony may be deemed to be
malicious, see text accompanying notes 42-91 infra.
25. 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 87 P.2d 374 (1939), noted in 27 CALIF. L. REV. 612
(1939).
26. 31 Cal. App. 2d at 56, 87 P.2d at 366. The conspirator who was not
present at the robbery was tried for both robbery and murder, but was convicted only
of the former crime.
27. Id. at 60, 87 P.2d at 368.
28. Id. at 58, 87 P.2d at 367.
29. 292 Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920).
30. 31 Cal. App. 2d at 60, 87 P.2d at 368.
31. Id.
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mon design to commit the felony. Rather than furthering the conspiracy,
by promoting the successful perpetration of the felonies, the deaths of
the accomplices hindered the successful completion of the crimes in
question. The Cabaltera court should have applied the same reason-
ing. It cannot possibly be argued that the conspirators had a com-
mon design to kill the decedent, since it is clear from the facts that his
death was not planned. Moreover, the killing of a coconspirator is an
act likely to impede the successful completion of the felony. Therefore,
the killing should have been considered an act not in furtherance of the
common design of the conspiracy and thus not imputable to the con-
spirators who had not fired the fatal shot.
Rather than adopting the above reasoning, the court denied the de-
fendants the benefit of the doctrine that the acts of a coconspirator not
in furtherance of the original plan may not be imputed to any of his ac-
complices. The court dismissed the application of the doctrine with
one sentence: "Such a doctrine is not available, however, to co-conspira-
tors in cases such as this, where the killing is done during the perpetra-
tion of a robbery in which they were participating."3 2  Cabaltero thus
held that once it is established that a killing occurred during the per-
petration of certain felonies, the felony-murder rule may properly be
invoked. One author pointed out the absurd results to which the rea-
soning in Cabaltero could lead:
Applying the expressed ratio of Cabaltero, if one of two burglars
ransacking a home glances out of a window, sees his enemy for
whom he has long been searching and shoots him, the unarmed
accomplice, party only to the burglary, will be guilty of murder in
the first degree.33
Under the established law of conspiracy, such a result would be pa-
tently unjust.
Both Ferlin and Cabaltero remain the law in California. In two
recent court of appeal cases with factual situations almost identical to
People v. Ferlin that case was followed. 4 In both cases the person hired
to set fire to a building accidentally burned himself to death. The court
in each case refused to hold the defendant responsible for the death.
In one case the prosecution tried to argue that Cabaltero had over-
32. Id. at 61, 87 P.2d at 368.
33. Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U.
PA. L Rnv. 50, 73 (1956). This article also discusses the early English case of Rex v.
Plummer, 84 Eng. Rep. 1103 (K.B. 1708), wherein one conspirator intentionally shot
one of his partners because he believed the latter had informed the police of their
unlawful plan. Since the defendant, also an accomplice, did not fire the shot which
killed his coconspirator, the English court held he could not be convicted, as the murder
was not done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 1105.
34. People v. Jennings, 243 Cal. App. 2d 324, 52 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1966);
Woodruff v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 749, 47 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1965).
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ruled Ferlin sub silentio.3 5  The court rejected this argument, empha-
sizing the factual distinction between Ferlin and Cabaltero that had led
to different results: Skala killed himself and Ancheta was intentionally
shot by a coconspirator. 6
Thus, the California courts have adopted two inconsistent rules:
When a conspirator accidentally kills himself during the commission of
a felony, the death will not be considered to be in furtherance of the
common plan and the defendant will not be convicted under the felony-
murder rule. However, if a cofelon shoots his accomplice during the
felony, the death need not be in furtherance of the conspiracy to ren-
der the defendant criminally liable under the rule. There is no logical
reason for this distinction. Both deaths occurred during the commis-
sion of a felony; both deaths hindered the successful completion of the
felony. Therefore, it is submitted that Ferlin and Cabaltero are irrecon-
cilable.3
7
B. Responsibility for a Homicide Committed by a Non-Felon
The California courts have developed a different approach in cases
where someone other than a felon performs the act resulting in a death
during the perpetration of a felony. The first case of this type is People
v. Harrison.38  The defendant and Blackshear entered a cleaning es-
tablishment intending to rob it. When Harrison began shooting, an
employee returned the gunfire. One of the employee's shots mortally
wounded the owner.3 9 The court affirmed the first degree murder con-
viction of the defendants.4 0 The court based its holding on the ground
that the defendants were the proximate cause of the death of the proprie-
tor. It was foreseeable that the robbery would provoke the victims to
defend their property and lives, and that this defense would place by-
standers in a position of danger. Therefore, the court concluded that
35. Woodruff v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 749, 750, 47 Cal. Rptr. 291,
293 (1965).
36. Id. at 751, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
37. The supreme courts of Montana and Pennsylvania have both been called upon
to decide whether the felony-murder rule may be applied to factual situations similar to
that of Ferlin. State v. Morran, 131 Mont. 17, 306 P.2d 679 (1957); Commonwealth v.
Bolish, 391 Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447 (1958). Both states held that the felony-murder
rule was applicable. In Commonwealth v. Bolish, 391 Pa. 550, 553, 138 A.2d 447,
449 (1958), the Pennsylvania court said, "The element of malice, present in the
design of defendant, necessarily must be imputed to the resulting killing, and made
him responsible for the death." Both courts failed to realize that there was no killing
of one human being by another involved in these cases. Moreover, the Pennsylvania
court declared that since the deceased died while trying to perpetrate the felony, his
death was in furtherance of the felony. Id.
38. 176 Cal. App. 2d 330, 1 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1959).
39. Id. at 331, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 415-16.
40. Id. at 346, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
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the defendants could properly be convicted of first degree murder by
application of the felony-murder rule. 41
The Supreme Court of California abandoned the line of reasoning
used in People v. Harrison when it decided People v. Washington4" in
1965. The defendant and Ball attempted to rob a gas station. When
Ball entered the office with a gun aimed at the owner, the latter, having
been warned by a shout of "robbery," fatally shot Ball. The owner, see-
ing Washington running from the vault, shot and wounded him.43 The
court reversed Washington's conviction of the first degree murder of
Ball.44 Chief Justice Traynor, speaking for the court, emphatically
stated that, when one of the felons does not commit the homicide, that
death does not come within the purview of the felony-murder rule.
45
The Chief Justice observed that:
When a killing is not committed by a robber or by his accomplice
but by his victim, malice aforethought is not attributable to the
robber, for the killing is not committed by him in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate robbery. It is not enough that the killing
was a risk reasonably to be foreseen and that the robbery might
therefore be regarded as a proximate cause of the killing. Section
189 requires that the felon or his accomplice commit the killing,
for if he does not, the killing is not committed to perpetrate the
felony. 4
6
The Chief Justice stated that the purpose of the felony-murder rule
was to deter persons from killing accidentally or negligently during the
commission of a felony by holding them strictly responsible for any
homicide they commit. The purpose of the rule is not to prevent the
commission of felonies. Therefore, the rule does not compel holding
felons strictly responsible for killings comitted by their victims.47  To
invoke the rule when the intended victim or bystander commits the
homicide would be to punish the defendants not for their own conduct,
"but solely on the basis of the response by others that the robber's con-
duct happened to induce.1
48
The court, however, made it clear that a defendant in some cases
may be held criminally liable for a felony-related homicide which he
did not commit. The court postulated the situation of a felon who ini-
tiates a gun battle, thereby doing an intentional act "'that involves a
41. Id. at 345, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
42. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
43. Id. at 779, 402 P.2d at 132, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
44. Id. at 785, 402 P.2d at 135, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 447.




May 1971] CALIFORNIA FELONY-MURDER RULE 1333
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
high degree of probability that it will result in death.' "I In such a
case it is neither necessary nor permissible to impute malice by the in-
vocation of the felony-murder rule. Under the rules of causation, the
defendant's initiatory act, independent of the attempted commission of
the felony, will be sufficient to imply the necessary element of malice.5
The defendant will then be held responsible for any reasonable response
to his act." But, it is necessary to emphasize, the felony alone was not
sufficient under the Washington rule to supply the requisite mens rea
of malice. 2
The above dictum in Washington became the holding in the case
of People v. Gilbert.3 In Gilbert, the defendant and Weaver robbed a
savings and loan association office. As the two were leaving the build-
ing, Gilbert fatally shot a police officer; another police officer then mor-
tally wounded Gilbert's accomplice. 4 Clearly, Gilbert fired the first
shot of the gun battle, but the Supreme Court reversed his murder con-
viction for the death of the accomplice because it was clear the court had
instructed the jury that the felony-murder rule could be used to raise
both homicides to the level of first degree murder.55 Under the
holding of the Washington case, the court pointed out, a defendant may
be convicted of murder only if malice is established independently of the
felony-murder rule.
Relying upon his Washington analysis, Chief Justice Traynor then
outlined the theory under which Gilbert could be convicted of first de-
gree murder for the death of Weaver. "Murder is the unlawful killing
of a human being, with malice aforethought." 56  Malice aforethought
can no longer be automatically imputed to felons if they have not com-
mitted a homicide during one of the enumerated felonies. But malice
may be implied under Penal Code section 188 if the defendant or de-
49. Id. at 782, 402 P.2d at 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446, quoting People v. Thomas,
41 Cal. 2d 470, 480, 261 P.2d 1 (1953).
50. "Such malice may be expressed or implied. It is expressed when there is
manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow-creature.
It is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances
attending the killing show an abandoned or malignant heart." CAL. PEN. CODE § 188.
51. 62 Cal. 2d at 782, 402 P.2d at 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
52. It is perhaps more than a coincidence that Chief Justice Traynor's hypo-
thetical in Washington paralleled the facts of Harrison. Although the Chief Justice
disapproved of the proximate cause rationale used in Harrison, his analysis would indi-
cate that court could have achieved the same result by the application of the rules of
causation. Id. at 782 n.2, 402 P.2d at 134 n.2, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446 n.2.
53. 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
54. Id. at 696-97, 408 P.2d at 369, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
55. Id. at 703, 408 P.2d at 373, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 917.
56. CAL. PEN. CODE § 187.
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fendants do an act which is in "wanton disregard for human life." 7
Chief Justice Traynor stated that "[ilnitiating a gun battle is such an
act.", 8
The court next indicated that the killing must be "attributable,
not merely to the commission of a felony, but to the intentional act of
the defendant or his accomplice committed with conscious disregard for
life."5 Thus, if the victim of the felony or a police officer kills someone
in a reasonable response to the act of the defendant, the killing is at-
tributable to the defendant. Thus, the court concluded, malice has been
established without reference to the felony-murder rule and the homicide
is therefore murder. 0
Chief Justice Traynor then applied the degree statute:
When murder is established under Penal Code sections 187 and
188 pursuant to the principles defined above, section 189 may
properly be invoked to determine the degree of that murder.
Thus, even though malice aforethought may not be implied under
section 189 to make a killing murder unless the defendant or his
accomplice commits the killing in the perpetration of an inherently
dangerous felony. . . when a murder is otherwise established, sec-
tion 189 may be invoked to determine its degree. 61
Although Chief Justice Traynor did not state explicitly the manner in
which section 189 was to be employed, it seems clear that he was re-
ferring to the "wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing"' 2 clause of
that section, not to the felony-murder provision. 63  If the jury should
find that the defendant's act, of firing first was deliberate and premedi-
tated then they could find the defendant guilty of first degree murder.
Thus the California court held that under an alternative theory of
liability64 a felon may be found guilty of first degree murder for a homi-
cide committed by his victim or a bystander. Under the pre-Washing-
ton application of the felony-murder rule such a defendant was guilty
57. 63 Cal. 2d at 704, 408 P.2d at 373, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 917. For the text of
Penal Code section 188, see note 50 supra.
58. 63 Cal. 2d at 704, 408 P.2d at 373, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 917.
59. Id. at 704, 408 P.2d at 374, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 705, 408 P.2d at 374, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
62. See Pmn Ns, supra note 1, at 722 n.60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 provides
in part: "All murder which is perpetrated by . . . any . . . kind of wilful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing. . . is murder of the first degree. .... "
63. For the felony-murder provision of CAL. PENAL CODE § 189, see text accom-
panying note 5 supra.
64. It is true that this alternative theory is merely the application of well-
established rules of causation. See PERKINs, supra note 1, at 719-22. The term
"alternative theory of liability" is used throughout this article as a matter of conveni-
ence, not to suggest that Chief Justice Traynor had developed a theory of liability that
had never before been considered.
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of first degree murder as a matter of law. Under Washington and
Gilbert it becomes a question of fact for the jury whether the defen-
dant's conduct was sufficiently aggravated to justify a conviction of
first degree murder. In these two decisions the California Supreme
Court both restricted the scope of the felony-murder doctrine and pro-
vided a rational basis for punishing those who, while committing dan-
gerous felonies, initiate gun battles resulting in death.
Since Gilbert the California appellate courts have twice been called
upon to apply Chief Justice Traynor's alternative theory. 5  In neither
case, however, did the court faithfully follow the lead of the Chief Jus-
tice. In People v. Reed6" the court of appeal both misunderstood the
purpose for which section 189 was to be invoked and seemingly ex-
panded the definition of "initiatory act." In the 1970 case of Taylor
v. Superior Court,67 this apparent expansion was accepted by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court which thus repudiated its 5-year old Washington
decision.
In People v. Reed 8 the defendant appealed the order of the su-
perior court denying him a new trial for the charges of first degree
murder, robbery and kidnapping for the purpose of robbery. Reed had
robbed a gas station and was about to leave, taking the gas station at-
tendant with him, when the police arrived. Defendant was entering
the back seat of the car of the attendant but got out when the police
ordered him to halt. When one of the police officers saw Reed start
to point his gun, first in the police officer's direction and then in the
direction of the attendant, the officer fired three shots. One of these
shots killed the attendant.
69
The court of appeal, in affirming the defendant's first degree
murder conviction, followed the alternative theory as stated in Gilbert.
In Reed, however, the defendant did not initiate the gunplay. The
court nevertheless thought it would be unreasonable to allow the rob-
ber the courtesy of the first shot, holding that the defendant by pointing
his gun at the victim and the police officer was the real initiator of the
gun battle. Therefore, the court found that the necessary element of
malice was supplied by the pointing of the gun, the police officers re-
sponse was reasonable, and hence the defendant was the proximate cause
of the death. 0 When section 189 was invoked, the defendant's lia-
bility was determined to be first degree murder. 1
65. Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275
(1970); People v. Reed, 270 Cal. App. 2d 37, 75 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1969).
66. 270 Cal. App. 2d 37, 75 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1969).
67. 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970).
68. 270 Cal. App. 2d 37, 75 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1969).
69. Id. at 41-42, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
70. Id. at 45-46, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
71. Id. at 47-48, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
Rather than using the theory enunciated in Washington and Gil-
bert for affirming the defendant's conviction of first-degree murder, the
court could have employed the rationale of the "shield" cases. The law
is well settled that a felon has acted with malice when he uses his vic-
tim or a bystander as a shield to protect himself from the gunfire of
the police. 72 If he is killed by the officers' bullets, it is the defendant
who, acting with express malice, has caused the death. In Reed, when
the defendant placed the victim in the car, he exposed him to the deadly
fire of the police. Therefore, he was clearly guilty of murder. If the
Reed court had applied the "shield" theory, it could have held the de-
fendant responsible for the death of his victim without having to ex-
pand the Washington-Gilbert meaning of "initiatory act." As will be
discussed later, the supreme court in Taylor v. Superior Court73 used the
holding of the Reed case as a foundation for its repudiation of the
Washington decision.
The Reed court further deviated from Gilbert by misapplying
section 189. As discussed above, Gilbert required the jury to deter-
mine whether the defendant had acted wilfully, deliberately and with
premeditation, thereby meeting the criteria of section 189 for first de-
gree murder. After quoting Chief Justice Traynor's statement regarding
the invocation of section 189, the Reed court went on to say:
In other words, although a homicide committed neither by the
defendant, nor by an accomplice, cannot be felony murder, if the
victim is killed in the "perpetration or attempt to perpetrate ...
robbery . . ." and the defendant is guilty of murder because of
his "conscious disregard for life," then the murder will be of the
first degree.
74
It seems evident that the Reed court failed to comprehend Chief Jus-
tice Traynor's analysis of section 189 as stated in Washington and Gil-
bert. In Washington the Chief Justice reasoned that the felony-murder
provision of section 189 was inapplicable to the facts at bar:
Section 189 requires that the felon or his accomplice commit the
killing, for if he does not, the killing is not committed to perpetrate
the felony. Indeed, in the present case the killing was committed
to thwart a felony. To include such killings within Section 189
would expand the meaning of the words "murder . . which is
committed in the perpetration ... [of] robbery . . ." beyond
common understanding.
75
When a homicide is determined to be murder under the alternative
theory, the felony-murder provision at section 189 cannot be applied to
72. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 124-26 infra.
73. 3 Cal. 3d 573, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970).
74. 270 Cal. App. 2d at 47-48, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 437 (emphasis added).
75. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 442, 445 (1965) (emphasis added).
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convict the defendant of first degree murder because the killing was
not committed to perpetrate the felony. If the reasoning in Reed is
accepted, however, then for the purpose of applying the degree statute a
murder that has occurred during the perpetration of a felony will be
legally equivalent to a murder that was committed in the perpetration
of the felony. The defendant therefore must invariably be convicted of
first degree murder-a theory which is clearly not supported by the
Gilbert decision. The Reed perversion of the Gilbert rule would make
the question of first degree murder one of law and not of fact.
The most recent California case in which the intended victim of the
felony committed the homicide is Taylor v. Superior Court,76 decided
in 1970 by the supreme court. While the defendant waited in a geta-
way car, Daniels and Smith entered a liquor store operated by Mr. and
Mrs. West. Mrs. West, who was on a ladder when the two men entered
the store, heard Daniels order her husband to "[p]ut the money in a
bag," 7 and make several threats that Mr. West would be killed if he
did not comply with their demands. During this time Smith was hold-
ing a gun on Mr. West. When Daniels forced Mr. West to the floor,
Mrs. West began firing with a hidden gun, fatally wounding Smith,
who had returned her gunfire.""
The court held that the evidence justified a prosecution for first
degree murder."9 Conceding that the felony-murder rule was inappli-
cable, Justice Burke, writing for the majority, used the Washington-Gil-
bert alternative theory to dispose of the case. Citing Washington, the
court stated that malice may be implied from the acts of a conspirator
that are done in wanton disregard for human life.80 The majority opin-
ion then quoted Gilbert for the proposition that any reasonable response
to such an act is attributable to the defendant or his accomplice. s ' The
court stated that the "central inquiry in determining criminal liability
for a killing committed by a resisting victim or police officer is whether
the conduct of a defendant or his accomplices was sufficiently provoca-
tive of lethal resistance to support a finding of implied malice. 8 - Since
neither the defendant nor his accomplices had fired the first shot, the
court relied on Reed to hold that the felons' "aggressive actions" fall-
ing short of firing the first shot may be sufficiently malicious to initiate
the gunplay." The aggressive actions in Taylor were the pointing of
76. 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970).
77. Id. at 581, 477 P.2d at 132, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
78. Id., 477 P.2d at 132-33, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 276-77.
79. Id. at 585, 477 P.2d at 135, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
80. Id. at 582, 477 P.2d at 133, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 583, 477 P.2d at 134, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
83. Id. at 584, 477 P.2d at 134, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 278. The court also relied on
the case of Brooks v. Superior Court, 239 Cal. App. 2d 538, 48 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1966).
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the gun and the repeated verbal threats of bodily harm. 84
In his dissent, Justice Peters argued that the majority opinion had
overruled People v. Washington85sub silentio and had repudiated much
of People v. Gilbert:
8 6
In holding that petitioner can be convicted of murder of John H.
Smith, the majority repudiate this court's holdings in People v.
Washington ...and People v. Gilbert . . . that robbers cannot
be convicted of murder for a killing by a victim unless the robbers
commit malicious acts, in addition to the acts constituting the un-
derlying felony, which demonstrate culpability beyond that of other
robbers.87
The only difference between Washington and the instant case, Jus-
tice Peters declared, was that in Washington Ball had made no ver-
bal threats when he pointed the gun at the gas station owner while in
the case at bar Daniels had threatened repeatedly to "execute" Mr.
West.88 This distinction, however, should not be controlling. If it is,
it results
in the absurd distinction that robbers who point guns at their
victims without articulating the obvious threat inherent in such ac-
tion cannot be convicted of murder for a killing committed by the
victims, whereas robbers who point guns at their victims and ar-
ticulate their threat can be convicted of murder in the same situa-
tion. To hold, as do the majority, that petitioner can be convicted
of murder for acts which constitute a first degree robbery solely be-
cause the victims killed one of the robbers is in effect to reinstate
the felony-murder rule in cases where the victim resists and
kills. 89
In making this distinction without a difference, the court clearly
overruled the Washington decision which, said the dissent,
stands for the proposition that the act .of pointing a gun at the
victim, unlike the act of initiating a gun battle, is not an act done
"'with wanton disregard for human life,'" involving "'a high
But the Brooks case does not lend support to the majority argument in Taylor. In
Brooks the petitioner was in a riot area and was ordered to leave by a police officer at
gun point. Brooks grabbed the gun, which discharged, killing one of the police officers.
Thus, because the defendant's act was a direct cause of the officer's death, there was
really no question of causation as there was in Washington. Rather, the court had to
decide whether the defendant had acted maliciously in causing the death. As Justice
Peters observed in his dissent in Taylor, "causing a gun to discharge by attempting to
wrestle it from another is almost tantamount to shooting a gun one's self [sic]."
3 Cal. 3d at 591, 477 P.2d at 140, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
84. 3 Cal. 3d at 584, 477 P.2d at 135, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
85. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
86. 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
87. 3 Cal. 3d at 585, 477 P.2d at 135, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 279 (Peters, J., dissenting).
88. Id., 477 P.2d at 135, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 279-80.
89. Id., 477 P.2d at 135-36, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 279-80 (dissenting opinion).
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degree of probability that it will result in death' " from which
malice can be implied. 90
Continuing his attack on the majority opinion, Justice Peters as-
serted that the acts of the felons in Taylor, like those in Washington,
constituted nothing more than first degree robbery. Since the robbers
committed no additional acts, the majority was using the robbery to sup-
ply the element of malice necessary for murder. Thus, the felony-mur-
der rule was effectively reinstated.91
To summarize, Washington held the felony-murder rule could not
be invoked if a felon did not commit the homicide. To convict the
felon of murder, the state has to establish malice without reference to
the underlying felony. The defendant must have committed some act
other than the res gestae of the felony from which malice may be im-
plied. In Gilbert, the act held to be malicious was the firing of a shot
which initiated a gun battle. Although Reed seemingly held that the
pointing of a gun was sufficiently malicious to justify a conviction of
murder, the "shield case" rationale is a better justification for the af-
firmance of the conviction.92 In Taylor, however, the supreme court
effectively held that malice may be implied from the res gestae of a
robbery. Its reliance on verbal threats can only be characterized as
make-weight.
Thus, the California appellate courts have made a complete circle,
for they are once again recognizing the underlying felony as the proxi-
mate cause of the death. Despite the Washington holding, a felon may
be convicted under a modified version of the felony-murder rule for a
homicide whch he did not commit. If the Taylor decision is followed,
the perpetration of a felony-without more-will constitute malice. It
is true, of course, that the degree of murder is still a question for the
jury and, to that extent, Washington has retained its vitality. But the
supreme court is no longer adhering to the spirit of that decision, for
the distinction between the commission of the felony and the initiatory
act has been obliterated.93
Thus far, this paper has attempted to analyze the limitations on the
90. Id. at 586, 477 P.2d at 136, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 280 (dissenting opinion).
91. Id. at 590, 477 P.2d at 139, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 284-85 (dissenting opinion).
92. In his Taylor dissent, Justice Peters argued that Reed might be properly
characterized as a shield case. Id. at 590-91, 477 P.2d at 140, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
93. While Chief Justice Traynor stated that an initiatory act must be something
"more" than the underlying felonious act and, in Gilbert, held that initiating a gun
battle satisfies this requirement, the point at which an action ceases to be merely a
felonious act and becomes an initiatory act is unsettled. This is clearly a question of
fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis if this portion of the Washington-Gilbert
rule is to retain vitality. The Taylor decision, however, repudiates this distinction and
effectively reinstitutes the older felony-murder rule of imputing malice solely on the
basis of the underlying felonious act.
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felony-murder rule in California. The next question is whether sub-
stantial justice is achieved under the present state of the law. In order
to answer that question it will be useful to see how the other jurisdictions
have approached the problem.
The Other Jurisdictions: Limitations
Under Different Theories
This discussion will be confined to the following categories: the
agency theory, the proximate cause theory, the "shield" cases and stat-
utory interpretation. In determining whether a felon may be con-
victed under the felony-murder rule for a homicide committed by his
victim (or a bystander), many courts have employed the agency the-
ory or narrowly interpreted the felony-murder statute of their respective
states to hold the defendant not guilty of murder. The proximate cause
theory, used by several courts to affirm a conviction, is now in disfavor.
Finally, the "shield" case rationale, although being employed to find
liability is really not an application of the felony-murder rule at all.
A. The Agency Theory
Probably the earliest American case to discuss a felon's responsi-
bility for the acts of his victim was the 1863 decision of Commonwealth
v. Campbell.94 In dictum the Massachusetts court stated the following
example:
Suppose . . . a burglar attempts to break into a dwelling-house,
and the owner or occupant, while striving to resist and prevent the
unlawful entrance, by misadventure kills his own servant. Can the
burglar in such case be deemed guilty of criminal homicide? Cer-
tainly not.95
The court proceeded to outline its "agency" theory of criminal liability.9 6
It is an accepted rule of law that persons who combine for an unlawful
purpose are each legally responsible for the consequences that naturally
result from the unlawful act.97
But, the court continued,
[t]he rule of criminal responsibility for the acts of others is subject
to the reasonable limitation that the particular act of one of a
94. 89 Mass. (7 Alien) 541, 83 Am. Dec. 705 (1863).
95. Id. at 545, 83 Am. Dec. at 709.
96. Several authors have used the term "agency theory," arguing that some
courts have adopted agency principles to resolve problems when applying the felony-
murder rule. Acts not in furtherance of the common design are not within the scope
of the agency, and therefore members of the conspiracy may not be held responsible for
such acts. E.g., Note, Criminal Law-Application of Felony-Murder Rule Sustained
Where Robbery Victim Killed Defendant's Accomplice, 5 DEPAUL L Rnv. 298, 299
(1956); Note, A Survey of Felony Murder, 28 TEMp. L.Q. 453, 461 (1955).
97. PRmuNs, supra note 1, at 632-35.
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party for which his associates and confederates are to be held lia-
ble must be shown to have been done for the furtherance or in pros-
ecution of the common object and design for which they com-
bined together. Without such limitation, a person might be held
responsible for acts which were not the natural or necessary con-
sequences of the enterprise or undertaking in which he was en-
gaged, and which he could not either in fact or in law be deemed
to have contemplated or intended.98
Since it cannot be argued that one who is resisting the commission of
an unlawful act is furthering the common purpose of the conspiracy,99
it therefore followed that a felon might be found guilty only if he or his
confederates have committed the act resulting in death.
The court stated that the above analysis was correct although the
taking of a human life would not have occurred but for the felon's un-
lawful acts, which furnished the cause for the use of weapons. It is
true that the felon is in fact the cause of the death, but his liability is
nevertheless limited by the rule that only acts done by a person or those
with whom he is associated may be imputed to him.' 0
Although the question before the court in Campbell was whether a
rioter may be held criminally responsible for the fatal consequences of
a shot fired by a person trying to terminate the riot,' the case is con-
sidered the leading authority on the agency theory of criminal liability
in felony-murder cases. The theory has been followed by other courts
which have refused to apply the felony-murder rule when a nonpartici-
pant in the felony fired the fatal shot.'0 2
In Commonwealth v. Moore,1 3 for example, the Kentucky court
applied the same reasoning as did the Massachusetts court. In this case
the two defendants attempted to rob two victims. But one victim, in an
98. 89 Mass. (7 Allen) at 544, 83 Am. Dec. at 709.
99. Id. at 544-45, 83 Am. Dec. at 709.
100. Id. at 545-46, 83 Am. Dec. at 710.
101. It may be argued that the court could have found that the defendant was
criminally responsible for the death in question if it had analyzed the facts at bar in
terms of causation. The defendant and his coconspirators had acted maliciously when
they began to fire, and they were consequently responsible for the death which resulted
from the return gunfire. PERKINS, supra note 1, at 720. Nevertheless, it remains true
that the dicta in the case concerning the application of the felony-murder rule were
sound: if a death is not in furtherance of the contemplated felony, malice should not
be imputed under the rule. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783, 402 P.2d 130,
134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1965).
102. Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905); Commonwealth
v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 209 N.E.2d 308 (1965); State v. Majors, 237 S.W. 486
(Mo. 1922); cf. People v. Garippo, 292 Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920); Butler v. People,
125 Ill. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888). Contra, People v. Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 194 N.E.
539 (1935).
103. 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905).
1342 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 22
effort to resist the robbery, shot the other victim. In affirming the or-
der dismissing the indictment for murder, the court said:
In order that one may be guilty of homicide, the act must be done by
him actually or constructively, and that cannot be, unless the crime
be committed by his own hand, or by the hands of someone acting
in concert with him, or in furtherance of a common object or pur-
pose.
104
A different approach to the problem has been taken by some
states, which have applied the doctrine of proximate cause to sustain
convictions under the felony-murder rule.'05
B. The Proximate Cause Theory
The leading authority for the incorporation of proximate cause into
the felony-murder rule was Commonweatih v. Almeida.10 Although
this Pennsylvania case was overruled in 1970,10" it nevertheless remains
the best exposition of the theory as it has been adopted by other juris-
dictions. In Almeida the defendant was found guilty of murder of a po-
lice officer who was killed in the cross fire between the robbers and
other police officers. The evidence did not clearly disclose who fired
the fatal shot, but the trial court gave an instruction that it was imma-
terial whether the defendant fired the shot. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania approved this instruction:
If one or more persons set in motion a chain of circumstances out of
which death ensues, those persons must be held responsible for
any death which by direct, by almost inevitable sequence, results
from such unusual criminal act.'
0 8
Under the Almeida rule, the felon need not fire the fatal shot. It
is forseeable that a person attempting to rob another will meet violent
resistance which may result in death. Therefore, the robbers were prop-
erly convicted of murder.'
104. Id. at 100, 88 S.W. at 1086.
105. Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1955); Griffith v. State, 171 So. 2d 597
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201
(1952); Johnson v. State, 386 P.2d 236 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963); Commonwealth v.
Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950),
overruled, Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970).
Contra, State v. Andreu, 222 So. 2d 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
106. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950). See
Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970), n.1 for
complete history of this case.
107. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970),
noted in 43 TEMP. L.Q. 399 (1970).
108. Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 601, 68 A.2d 595, 598 (1949).
109. Id. at 604-05, 68 A.2d at 600. See also Note, Felon Convicted For The
Death of Co-Felon During Commission of Robbery, 43 U. DET. L. 118 (1965).
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In the 1955 decision of Commonwealth v. Thomas,10 Pennsyl-
vania extended its rule in Almeida, holding that a robber may be con-
victed of murder for the death of his partner, who was killed by their in-
tended victim. The person killed was irrelevant to the imposition of
criminal liability, for in a gun battle engendered by a robbery attempt, it
is equally foreseeable that a felon will be killed."'
In 1958, however, Pennsylvania began to retreat from its position
taken in Almeida and Thomas. In Commonwealth v. Redline, 12 the
defendant was convicted of murder for the death of his partner, who had
been shot by a police officer. The court, declaring that Almeida was a
"radical departure from common law criminal jurisprudence and [that]
the ruling should not be extended by still further judicial enlargement,""' 3
expressly overruled its 1955 Thomas decision. Although attack-
ing Almeida's use of the tort concept of proximate cause, the Red-
line court did not overrule the Almeida decision. Rather, the court
distinguished Almeida from Redline on the dubious basis that the homi-
cide in the instant case was justifiable, for which no one may be found
guilty, while the homicide in Almeida was merely excusable." 4
Pennsylvania's retreat, begun in Redline, was completed in 1970,
when the supreme court overruled Almeida and thus refused to apply
the tort concept of proximate cause to felony-murder cases." 5 The
110. 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955), overruled, Commonwealth v. Redline,
391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
111. 382 Pa. at 644-45, 117 A.2d at 206.
112. 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958), overruling Commonwealth v. Thomas,
382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
113. 391 Pa. at 490, 137 A.2d at 473.
114. Id. at 509, 137 A.2d at 483. Recognizing that the distinction between
Almeida and Redline was questionable, the court made this differentiation between
justifiable and excusable homicide only to preclude the further extension of the Almeida
rule. The court stated, "the distinction thus drawn between Almeida and the instant
case on the basis of the difference in the character of the victims of the homicide is
more incidental than legally significant so far as relevancy to the felony-murder rule is
concerned . . . . In other words, if a felon can be held for murder for a killing oc-
curring during the course of a felony, even though the death was not inflicted by one
of the felons but by someone acting in hostility to them, it should make no difference
to the crime of murder who the victim of the homicide happened to be." Id. at 509-10,
137 A.2d at 483. "The character of the deceased is deemed by some courts to be
the determining issue in homicides of this nature. Under this analysis, if those de-
fending against robbery have by accident caused the death of an innocent person the
robbers are guilty of first-degree murder, whereas if one of the robbers was killed, the
surviving robbers are guilty only of robbery. It is pointed out, in reaching this con-
clusion, that the one who fired the fatal shot is excused in the first type of situation
but justified in the second; whereupon the theory is advanced that no one can be
guilty of criminal homicide if the perpetrator was justified." PERKINS, supra note 1,
at 72.
115. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970).
Smith was one of Almeida's cofelons.
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court stated" 6 that, until the Almeida decision, the courts had uni-
formly followed the rule announced in Commonwealth v. Campbell."
7
The court considered the Campbell rule to be correct for two reasons.
First, the function of the felony-murder rule is to impute malice, not the
act of killing."" By the use of the doctrine of proximate cause in Al-
meida, the court not only imputed the mens rea of murder to the de-
fendant but also the actus reus of homicide. Under the felony-murder
rule the malice of the initial felony attaches to only those acts that a
felon or his accomplice actually commits. Second, the broad tort con-
cept of proximate cause simply has no place in the field of criminal
law:
To persist in applying the tort liability concept of proximate cause
to prosecutions for criminal homicide after the marked extension of
civil liability of defendants in tort actions for negligence would be
to extend possible criminal liability to persons chargeable with
unlawful or reckless conduct in circumstances not generally con-
sidered to present the likelihood of a resultant death.1 9
Furthermore, the underlying rationales of criminal and tort law are dif-
ferent. "The former is intended to impose punishment in appropriate
cases while the latter is primarily concerned with who shall bear the
burden of loss. '' 12° Thus, the first state to use the doctrine of proximate
cause in felony-murder cases will no longer apply it to impute a killing
to a felon.
Michigan, which also had adopted the proximate cause theory,' 2 '
is following the Pennsylvania lead in limiting its application. In 1963
the Michigan Supreme Court held that a felon could not be convicted
of murder under the felony-murder rule when a cofelon was killed by
the intended victim.' 22 Michigan, however, has only gone part way
in its retreat, for a felon may still be convicted of murder if the victim
is an innocent party. It is hoped that Michigan will accept the Pennsyl-
vania position that liability should not depend upon the identity of
the deceased and thus repudiate the application of proximate cause in
felony-murder cases.
It seems clear that courts are now reluctant to use the proximate
cause doctrine in felony-murder cases. The courts that had once em-
ployed the theory are beginning to realize that its use should be severely
restricted, if not totally abandoned.
116. Id. at 228, 261 A.2d at 555.
117. 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541, 83 Am. Dec. 705 (1863).
118. 438 Pa. at 227-28, 261 A.2d at 555.
119. Id. at 233, 261 A.2d at 557.
120. Id. at 232, 261 A.2d at 557, quoting 71 HAv. L. REv. 1565, 1566 (1958).
121. People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 845 (1952).
122. People v. Austin, 370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.2d 766 (1963).
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C. Other Approaches
Since the shield cases have been discussed above,123 only a short
analysis of them is necessary. Although the defendant is convicted for
a homicide committed by another person, the result may be justified
without reference to the felony-murder rule. To repeat, in a typical
shield case, the defendant uses an innocent party to protect himself from
the fire of those who are attempting to prevent his escape.' 24  The
cases agree with the dicta in Commonwealth v. Campbell'25 that a felon
should not be held responsible for acts not in furtherance of the crime,
but find another basis for liability. The felon has caused the death of
his victim by compelling him to maintain a position of danger where he
might absorb deadly gun fire. The placing of the victim in such a posi-
tion is itself a lethal act, for it is probable that he will suffer serious
injury or death. In these cases, the courts are not imputing malice un-
der the felony-murder rule; rather, the malice is express because the
act of the accused is a "direct and deliberate creation of immediate
lethal danger to the deceased and to him alone.'
'1 26
Finally, in a few states judicial construction of the felony-murder
statute has conferred immunity on a felon for a homicide committed by
a nonfelon. 2 7  For example, the New York felony-murder statute re-
quires that the killing be committed "by a person engaged in the com-
mission of, or in an attempt to commit, a felony. ... "128 Because of
the wording of the statute, the New York courts have not found it neces-
sary to evaluate the legal theories discussed above. Instead, the courts
have followed the literal wording of its felony-murder statute. 2 9  The
result is that in New York the felony-murder rule is confined to homi-
cides committed by felons.' 30
123. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
124. Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900), appealed, 63 S.W.
330 (1901); Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 621, 57 S.W. 1125 (1900).
125. 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541, 83 Am. Dec. 705 (1863).
126. Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U.
PA. L. REV. 50, 63 (1956).
127 State v. Garner, 238 La. 563, 115 So. 2d 855 (1959); People v. Woods, 9 App.
Div. 2d 433, 195 N.Y.S.2d 133, aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 167 N.E.2d 736, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328
(1960); People v. Udwin, 254 N.Y. 255, 172 N.E. 489 (1930).
128. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1044 (McKinney 1944), as amended, N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.25(3) (McKinney 1967) (emphasis added). The revised version of the statute
has made this limitation of its application even more emphatic. It provides that if
"he, or another participant, if there be any, causes the death of a person other than
one of the participants" during the commission of one of the enumerated felonies,
they will be found guilty of murder in the first degree.
129. People v. Woods, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 53-54, 167 N.E.2d 736, 740, 201 N.Y.S.2d
328 (1960).
130. In California, of course, the application of the felony-murder statute (CAL.




The trend in the United States has been to limit the application of
the felony-murder rule. The California rationale for restricting the
scope of the doctrine was first stated in People v. Ferlin,131 which held
that the defendant could not be convicted for his cofelon's accidental
death. Ferlin's conviction for murder was reversed because his
partner's fortuitous death was clearly not in furtherance of the contem-
plated crime. 32 Chief Justice Traynor employed the same rationale in
People v. Washington'33 to hold that the felony-murder rule could be
applied only when one of the conspirators was the direct cause of the
death in question. The Chief Justice reasoned that a homicide com-
mitted by the intended victim (and, by implication, an innocent by-
stander or a policeman) was "not committed to perpetrate the fel-
ony.,,Y
3 4
California has been unique in applying an alternative theory un-
der which the perpetrator of a felony who initiates a murderous gun
battle may be convicted of first degree murder. In Gilbert the court
held that the jury could convict the defendant of murder if they found
that his initial shot set off a chain of events which resulted in the death
of another. 3 5 The initial-shot test, developed in Washington and Gil-
bert, was repudiated in Taylor. In the latter case the supreme court held
that the mere pointing of a gun during the perpetration of a robbery was
sufficient to constitute malice and thus support a murder conviction.136
The court effectively obliterated the distinction between the felony-mur-
der rule and the alternative theory of liability. Gilbert held that the al-
ternative theory could be applied only when the victim was responding
to the initiatory acts of the felon; it could not be applied if the victim was
merely attempting to prevent the robbery. Since in Taylor, as the dis-
senters pointed out, the robbery was the initiatory act, Chief Justice
Traynor's distinction in Gilbert was rendered meaningless. Thus the
California Supreme Court has abandoned
the fundamental principle that the culpability of criminal defend-
ants should be determined by their own acts-not by the fortuitous
P.2d 130, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1965), which held that a homicide caused by a
victim's resistance was not "committed in the perpetration of" the felony in question.
See text accompanying notes 42-51 supra.
131. 203 Cal. 587, 265 P. 230 (1928).
132. See notes 17-23 & accompanying text supra.
133. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
134. Id. at 781, 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445. See notes 46-47 & ac-
companying text supra.
135. People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
See notes 56-62 & accompanying text supra.
136. Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275
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acts of their victims which are beyond the defendants' control and
thus logically irrelevant to the defendants' culpability.
137
Taylor has thus attempted to reverse the trend limiting the applica-
tion of the felony-murder rule. By use of a broad definition of "initia-
tory act," the Taylor court has made the felony-murder rule applicable
to defendants who have done no more than commit the underlying
felony. Such a result is in accord neither with the previous California
rule nor with the weight of authority in the other jurisdictions. It re-
mains to be seen whether the California Supreme Court will adhere to
Taylor or return to Washington and Gilbert.
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137. Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 592, 477 P.2d 131, 140, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 275, 284 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
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